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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes retirement saving and portfolio choice in the United States, Italy, and
the Netherlands. While these countries enjoy roughly the same standard of living, they vary widely
in their institutional organization of retirement income provisions. Building on extensions of the life
cycle model, we derive hypotheses on the implications of institutional differences for wealth
accumulation and portfolio composition. Examples of implications are that the ratio of net worth and
gross wealth should be highest in Italy, that Dutch households should hold the lowest wealth levels
at retirement and that the ownership of risky assets should be highest in the U.S. We investigate
these and other hypotheses at both the macro and micro level and find that the data are generally
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes retirement saving and portfolio choice in the United States, Italy, and 
the Netherlands.  In addition to relying on public retirement provisions, households 
prepare for retirement through tax-sheltered and after-tax savings.  They may invest these 
funds in a wide variety of assets, including housing, stocks, bonds, savings accounts, etc.  
These asset types differ in their risk, return, and liquidity characteristics as well as in their 
fiscal treatment.  Economic theory postulates that households allocate their portfolios 
according to their risk aversion, time horizon, uncertain out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures, income risk, informal (family) risk sharing arrangements, etc.  While the 
literature has tested various parts of the theory, both testing and quantification of the 
theory are hampered by the fact that some of the major variables do not exhibit sufficient 
variation within a country to establish their relative importance for portfolio choice, or, 
more generally, for retirement saving and investment.  This paper partially fills that gap 
by exploring three countries with widely varying institutional arrangements for retirement 
income. 
 
Portfolio allocation behavior is important for a number of reasons (e.g., Bertaut and Starr-
McCluer, 2000).  Returns vary across asset types, so portfolio composition has important 
implications for the pace of wealth accumulation and the degree of retirement 
preparedness; risks vary across asset types, so portfolio composition has important 
implications for the distribution of retirement income; portfolio decisions illuminate how 
tax policy affects household spending and saving; portfolio decisions illuminate how 
macro variables (interest rates, stock prices, inflation, unemployment) affect household 
spending and saving; and understanding households’ portfolio decisions may provide 
deeper insight into theories of consumption and saving behavior. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 poses a theoretical framework and briefly 
reviews the literature on the size and composition of the wealth holdings of the (nearly) 
retired.  Section 3 highlights relevant aspects of the legal and institutional environments 
of the three countries under study.  Section 4 describes the three countries’ microdata that 
we use.  Section 5 draws together the theoretical framework and the institutional 
differences to formulate four hypotheses about expected patterns in the microdata from 
the different countries.  Section 6 presents the empirical analysis with particular emphasis 
on Section 5’s hypotheses.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical Framework and Literature 
 
Our point of departure to study retirement savings is the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) 
formulated by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954).  The basic tenet of the LCH is that 
rational consumers will try to smooth consumption over the life cycle in such a way that 
the marginal utility of consumption is equalized across periods.  Since individuals usually 
have a life cycle income pattern that is inversely U-shaped (at young ages, earnings are 
modest but grow until roughly retirement, after which income declines), the life cycle 
pattern of wealth is also inversely U-shaped.  In its simplest form, sometimes referred to   2 
as a ‘stripped-down’ version (Browning and Lusardi, 1996), the LCH fails to explain 
several well-known facts.  Several extensions have therefore been introduced.  These 
include the incorporation of uncertainty, bequest motives, borrowing constraints, 
precautionary motives, transaction costs associated with the reshuffling of portfolios, 
taxes, and lack of financial sophistication.  We discuss several of these extensions below, 
in so far as they shed light on the portfolios of the (near-)retired.  Our interest is primarily 
in the implications of institutional arrangements for individuals’ wealth accumulation and 
profile. 
2.1. Retirement  Income  Replacement Rates and Wealth 
 
As documented below, the United States, Italy, and the Netherlands vary greatly in the 
fraction of pre-retirement income that is replaced by social security and private pensions.  
To illustrate the implications of varying replacement rates for wealth accumulation, we 
take a simple version of the LCH with time preference rates equal to the interest rate, a 
constant household composition, no uncertainty, no bequest motives, and no liquidity 
constraints.
1  Consumers live until they are 85 years old (which is known with certainty).  
In that case the optimal consumption profile over one’s life is flat, i.e., one should plan to 
spend the same amount of money each period.  This amount should be chosen in such a 
way that wealth is zero at the time of death. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the implications for saving and wealth accumulation for two different 
levels of retirement annuity incomes.  The income paths have been chosen in such a way 
that lifetime resources are equal, so that they both imply the same consumption level.  
Clearly, the income path with the less generous retirement income leads to more wealth 
accumulation.  Thus, the theory in its simple form would imply that those households 
with relatively meager pension provisions would save the most.   
 


































                                                 
1 The exposition is similar to illustrations by Bernheim, Skinner, Weinberg (2001).   3 




















Figure 1.  Income and Wealth Paths under Different Replacement Rates 
2.2. Precautionary  Saving 
 
In its simplest form, the introduction of uncertainty leads to a straightforward extension 
of the LCH.  Consumers still want to equalize the marginal utility of consumption across 
periods, but since they cannot control or foresee the future perfectly, they can now only 
equalize marginal utility in expectation.  If in each period, the world would turn out to be 
exactly as expected, the expectation would be realized perfectly and we would be back in 
the world illustrated by, for instance, Figure 1.  However, expectations are generally not 
realized exactly and on the basis of new information one has to re-optimize.  For 
example, an unanticipated adverse income shock will lead to a revision of the consumer’s 
expected income path over the life cycle, which in turn leads to a fall in consumption and 
a new trajectory for saving and wealth.  Clearly, consumers would like to guard 
themselves against unpleasant surprises.  An obvious strategy to do this is to save more as 
a matter of precaution.  A vast literature has developed this so-called “precautionary 
saving motive”.   
 
The extent to which consumers increase their saving when facing future risk is governed 
by “prudence” (Kimball, 1990; Gollier, 2001).  By definition, a consumer is prudent if 
adding a zero-mean risk to her future wealth raises her optimal saving.  An example of a 
zero-mean risk would be one where a consumer’s next year’s endowment has an equal 
probability of being higher or lower with respect to a baseline by, say, $1,000.  Whether a 
consumer is prudent depends on her preferences.
2  Consumers may not be prudent and 
hence will decrease saving if we make future financial resources more risky. 
 
                                                 
2 To be precise, a necessary and sufficient condition for prudence is that an agent’s marginal utility of 
future consumption is convex (Gollier, 2001, Proposition 60).  Prudence is related to, but not the same as 
risk aversion.  A consumer is prudent if absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth; in the special case of 
constant relative risk aversion, (relative) prudence is equal to (relative) risk aversion + 1.   4 
While there is no logical reason why consumers would have to increase saving in the face 
of increased future uncertainty, empirical work suggests that generally an increase in risk 
leads to more saving.  The estimated sizes of precautionary saving vary considerably 
across studies (e.g., Dynan 1993; Guiso, Jappelli, Terlizesse, 1992; Lusardi 1997; 
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini, 
2001). 
2.3.  Liquidity Constraints and Wealth Accumulation 
 
Liquidity constraints can take various forms.  The simplest form is a ceiling on the 
amount of money one can borrow.  In many instances such a ceiling is not cast in stone 
and if one is willing to pay higher interest on the money borrowed, it is possible to 
increase the loan amount.  More generally, the term “liquidity constraint” refers to the 
fact that borrowing rates are higher than lending rates.  Liquidity constraints induce extra 
saving in several ways.  The most straightforward case is where in a given period one 
would like to borrow, but cannot do so because of insufficient collateral or insufficient 
prospects of being able to pay back a loan in the future.  However, even if a constraint is 
not binding in a given period (i.e., income is higher than planned expenditures), the fact 
that one may face liquidity constraints in the future may increase saving in the current 
period.  In particular, liquidity constraints interact with income uncertainty since it 
increases the probability that adverse income shocks may necessitate the need to borrow 
in some future period.   
 
The intuitive effect of liquidity constraints is that it shortens one’s time horizon.  Without 
liquidity constraints, the consumption effects of an adverse income shock in a given 
period may be spread out over many periods by borrowing money to pay for consumption 
in a given period and then reducing consumption in all subsequent periods by a little bit, 
rather than immediately cutting consumption by the total shortfall in income.  This 
mechanism is known as time diversification and tends to reduce risk aversion (e.g., 
Gollier, 2001).  If liquidity constraints are binding, the possibility to spread out the 
consumption shortfall over many periods is absent, or at least more limited, and this acts 
as a shortening of the time horizon with a resulting increase in risk aversion.  The only 
way to reduce the risk of such a forced reduction in consumption is to save more.  
Savings then act as a “buffer stock” (Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1992, 1997).  Thus, liquidity 
constraints increase saving, even if they are not binding in the current period.   
2.4.  Portfolio Composition and Saving 
 
Commonly in economic models, consumers are assumed to be risk-averse.  That is, 
whenever a consumer is given a choice between a fixed amount of money and a gamble 
with expected payoff equal to the fixed amount, she will prefer the fixed amount.  As a 
result of this, a risk-averse consumer will only be willing to invest some of her savings in 
a risky asset if the expected return of the risky asset is higher than of a riskless asset.  The 
extent to which an individual is willing to invest in risky assets is determined by this 
individual’s risk aversion.  The literature distinguishes several measures of risk aversion, 
including coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion.  For the current discussion,   5 
the exact definitions of these risk aversion measures are of no great consequence.
3  If a 
risky asset is available with an expected return larger than of an available riskless asset 
(e.g., putting money in a savings account), the standard theory predicts that an individual 
will always put some money into the risky asset.  How much is put in the risky asset is a 
function of the risk aversion of the individual:  the more risk-averse the agent is, the less 
she will put in the risky asset. 
 
Since risky assets on average have a higher rate of return, it is of interest to know which 
people have the lowest risk aversion, as, on average, these are the people that will realize 
the highest return on their investment portfolio.  On the other hand, even though the 
average return on risky portfolios is higher, this of course does not carry over to every 
individual portfolio and the higher riskiness implies a higher dispersion in outcomes than 
for less risky portfolios. 
 
One “stylized fact” is that people with more wealth own more risky assets, such as stocks 
(e.g., Hochgürtel 1998, Barsky et al. 1997, Carroll 2001, Hurd 2001).  Under reasonable 
assumptions on the form of the utility function, this is indeed predicted by the theory.  
The theory predicts that for risk-averse consumers an increase in wealth increases the 
amount of stocks if individuals have decreasing absolute risk aversion.  However, 
following an increase in wealth, the share of risky assets may or may not increase.  For 
the share to increase, relative risk aversion must decrease with wealth.  The usual 
assumption is that it is constant, and thus the portfolio share should be independent of 
wealth.  Empirically, the evidence is not clear-cut:  evidence on relative risk aversion 
sometimes points at an increasing relationship to wealth (e.g., Guiso and Paiella, 2001); 
correlations between portfolio shares of risky assets and wealth are sometimes positive, 
consistent with decreasing relative risk aversion.  However, a positive correlation 
between a risky asset portfolio share and wealth may also arise because of fixed portfolio 
management costs.  Altogether, the relation between theory and the share of risky assets 
in total wealth is not yet clear-cut.   
 
Given that we are interested in the size and composition of portfolios with which people 
reach retirement age, the natural context in which to consider risk aversion is 
intertemporal.  That is, one should consider investments with an eye on their contribution 
to the financial resources at retirement.  The first implication of that viewpoint is that 
young people should invest in a more risky way than older people.  This is due to time 
diversification, i.e., the possibility for younger people to spread out any bad investment 
outcome over a longer period of their life.  This supports the usual advice by financial 
planners to reduce exposure to risk when one gets older.   
 
Another consequence of using an intertemporal framework is that we have to consider 
saving and investment decisions jointly.  Consider a case where an individual can divide 
savings into riskless and risky assets (with higher expected return than the riskless asset).  
                                                 
3 Formally, a utility function exhibits risk aversion if the function is concave.  The degree of absolute risk 
aversion is defined as minus the ratio of the second derivative of the utility function and the first derivative.  
If we multiply this quantity by the argument of the utility function we obtain the degree of relative risk 
aversion.   6 
Will this individual save more than if only a riskless asset were available?  This is 
relevant to assess the effects on saving decisions of financial innovation, such as the 
addition of new instruments.  The answer depends on the structure of the individual’s 
preferences, and in particular on this individual’s prudence and risk aversion.  If her 
prudence is sufficiently large relative to her risk aversion, the presence of a risky asset 
will increase saving.  If not, the availability of a risky asset will reduce saving.
4 
 
To understand this result, recall that if a risky asset is available, an agent will always 
invest something in it.  By investing something in the risky asset the total expected return 
on assets increases.  In itself, the increase of resources in the future due to the higher 
expected return of the investment in the risky asset will lead to a fall in saving in the 
current period.  However, also recall that precaution leads to more saving currently if 
uncertainty about the future goes up.  The investment in the risky asset does exactly that:  
It increases uncertainty about the future.  Whether the increase in current saving as a 
result of increasing future uncertainty dominates the fall in current saving as a result of 
the higher expected lifetime resources depends not only on the strength of the 
precautionary motive, but also on how much is invested in the risky asset.  The more risk-
averse the individual is, the smaller the amount she will invest in a risky asset.  Thus, in 
the case of high risk aversion and small precaution, the investment in a risky asset will be 
modest with little effect on the amount of precautionary saving.  Hence, current saving 
will fall as a result of higher expected future resources.  In the opposite case of a strong 
precautionary motive and low risk aversion, a considerable amount will be invested in the 
risky asset; this increases uncertainty considerably and through a strong precautionary 
motive, this will lead to positive effect on current saving that dominates the negative 
effect caused by the increase in expected lifetime resources. 
 
Which effect dominates empirically is a somewhat undecided issue, but under plausible 
assumptions about individual utility functions, it appears likely that the introduction of 
risky assets will decrease saving.   
 
Of course, investment risk is not the only risk that affects consumption possibilities.  
Different people are exposed to different amounts and different kinds of risk and one 
would expect this to affect an individual’s investment portfolio.  Intuitively, one might 
think that when one is exposed to risk in one dimension, one becomes more averse to risk 
in another dimension.  For instance, other things being equal, an individual with a very 
uncertain income may want to invest in a safer portfolio than someone whose income is 
virtually guaranteed.  It turns out that such an effect of “background risk” on risk 
aversion will only hold if preferences satisfy certain logical conditions (Kimball, 1993; 
Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Gollier, 2001).  Empirical work by Guiso, Jappelli, Terlizesse 
(1996) indicates that the presence of background risk lowers the willingness of 
households to hold risky assets.  Similarly, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) find that people 
in risky occupations are less likely to hold stocks.  Using a self-reported measure of risk 
aversion, Guiso and Paiella (2001) find that the presence of background risk increases 
                                                 
4 Saving will increase if and only if the degree of absolute prudence is larger than twice the degree of 
absolute risk aversion.  See Gollier (2001).   7 
measured risk aversion.  Thus, we tentatively conclude that individual preferences do 
satisfy the logical conditions for an increase in background risk to increase risk aversion.   
 
As noted above, the presence of liquidity constraints works as if risk aversion increases.  
Guiso, Jappelli, Terlizesse (1996) indeed find some evidence that the presence of 
liquidity constraints reduces the demand for risky assets.  Liquidity constraints may also 
have other implications for portfolio choice.  For instance, if an individual faces 
borrowing ceilings this may induce her to hold more assets in liquid form than she would 
otherwise (Paxson, 1990).   
 
Recall that if a risky asset (that pays a premium) is offered, a consumer will always invest 
something in it.  This statement can be generalized to the case where one can choose 
from an array of risky assets.  Unless the returns on these assets are perfectly correlated, 
an investor should have a portfolio that has at least a little of each.  Of all the predictions 
of the theory, this is probably the one that is most clearly false.  For example, a majority 
of households does not own any stock.  One can think of various reasons why portfolios 
are incomplete, i.e., do not contain all assets.  Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) list a number 
of reasons, including the cost of acquiring information about stocks, transactions costs 
(see also Vissing Jørgensen, 2000), minimum investment requirements, and deviations 
from the expected utility models underlying the LCH.  They find a strong effect of 
education, which suggests that stocks, being fairly complicated products, require a certain 
amount of knowledge that may be lacking in some parts of the population.  This is 
supported by a finding by King and Leape (1998) that about 40 percent of the non-
stockholders in their sample (of Canadian respondents) state that they did not know 
enough about the stock market.   
 
Somewhat in line with the interpretation of these education effects, Benartzi and Thaler 
(2001) provide strong empirical evidence that portfolio choice may be a much less 
rational and forward-looking process than economic theory suggests.  In particular, they 
provide evidence for what they call the “1/n strategy” among participants in defined 
contribution saving plans:  participants tend to divide their contributions evenly across 
the funds offered in the plan.  Thus the extent of stockholding may be expected to be 
influenced not only by the behavior of individual investors, but also by the behavior of 
institutions offering different investment options. 
2.5.  Retirement Saving, Tax Incentives, Social Security, and Pensions 
 
Bernheim (1999) provides an excellent review of the literature on taxation and saving.  
Here we briefly touch on three important issues: (1) the saving effects of various forms of 
tax-deferred saving vehicles such as IRAs and 401(k)s, (2) the displacement effects of 
pensions and social security on private retirement saving, and (3) the effect of implicit 
taxes in income maintenance programs on saving behavior. 
 
Theoretically, the effect of tax deferred saving vehicles on private saving is ambiguous.  
For instance by putting money into an IRA an individual avoids paying taxes on part of 
her income now, but will have to pay taxes on the money taken out of the IRA later.  Not   8 
having to pay tax on the income put in an IRA amounts to an increase in the rate of return 
on saving.  Such an increase in the rate of return has two effects.  First, the higher return 
on the investment in an IRA makes it attractive to save, because it lowers the price of 
future consumption relative to the price of current consumption.  Next to this 
“substitution effect” there is also an “income effect.”  The higher rate of return amounts 
to an increase in lifetime resources, which in itself raises current consumption, and hence 
lowers saving.  In view of this theoretical ambiguity, empirical research has to settle the 
issue of the direction and the strength of the tax subsidy effect on private saving.  
Different researchers have reached very different conclusions.  Authors such as Engen, 
Gale and Scholz (1996) find that these saving incentives have little or no effect, whereas 
others, notably Venti and Wise (1990, 1991, 1995) find very substantial effects.  Clearly 
the answer to the question of the effectiveness of saving incentives is very important in 
view of the total amount of taxes foregone as a result of these incentives.   
 
One of the clear implications of the above graphical illustration of the LCH is that people 
should save more for retirement the lower their retirement income will be relative to their 
pre-retirement earnings.  Conversely, the more generous pensions or social security 
income will be, the less incentive there is to save for retirement.  This is known as the 
“displacement effect” of pensions and social security on private savings (Feldstein, 
1974).  Yet, empirical research has shown repeatedly that households with relatively 
generous pensions are also the households that save the most or at least do not save less 
than other households (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier, 1998).  However, this may simply 
reflect differences in tastes: some people have a stronger taste for saving than others.  
And those that do tend to both arrange for more generous pensions and to accumulate 
more private wealth.  Assuming that on average the tastes for saving do not differ 
substantially across countries, a cross-country comparison should bear out that in 
countries with more generous old age pensions systems people save less than in countries 
with less generous systems.  See below. 
 
Government regulations may impose various implicit taxes on saving.  A particularly 
important class of implicit taxes consists of asset-based means tests in various income 
maintenance programs, like Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, 
or Food Stamps.  As a result, someone with low and uncertain income has a strong 
incentive not to save if income maintenance is asset-tested, because every time she 
experiences a bad income draw, she first has to run down her assets before qualifying for 
income support.  She can maintain a higher consumption level on average by not saving 
and drawing income support if income falls below the cut-off point for qualification.  
Hubbard, Skinner, Zeldes (1994a, 1994b, 1995) show that a model incorporating these 
features along with uncertainty and liquidity constraints is able to reproduce the observed 
wealth distribution and its evolution over time quite well. 
   9 
3.  Legal and Institutional Environments 
 
Kapteyn and Panis (2002) provide a detailed discussion of legal issues and institutional 
features that affect retirement income in the United States, Italy, and the Netherlands.  
This section highlights the features that are relevant for our purposes.  In separate 
subsections, we highlight the three legs of the proverbial retirement income stool:  social 
security, occupational pensions, and private savings.
5  We then discuss capital market 
imperfections (transaction costs and liquidity constraints) and exposure to financial risks 
in retirement. 
3.1. Social  Security 
 
In the United States, social security is mainly provided as Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI).
6  It makes cash payments to retired workers, spouses of retired 
workers, and widows and children of deceased workers.  A separate program, 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), makes cash payments to, among others, needy 
elderly.  The Italian social security program, Programma Nazionale di Sicurezza Sociale, 
makes cash payments to retired workers and widow(er)s of deceased workers; it also 
guarantees a minimum benefit for the poor.  The Italian program does not have a spousal 
benefit.  In the Netherlands, cash payments are made to elderly individuals—regardless 
of their work history—on the basis of the General Old-Age Act (Algemene Ouderdoms 
Wet, AOW).  We use the term “social security” to refer to all programs that pay cash 
benefits to the elderly, regardless of whether the entitlement originates from contributive 
insurance or social assistance. 
 
All three social security programs are predominantly funded on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
basis.  The United States maintains a buffer in the form of an OASI trust fund.  There is 
no trust fund in Italy.  Italian social security outlays currently exceed contributions by 
about 8-17 percent of payroll (Brugiavini 1999); the difference is funded from general tax 
revenues.  The Netherlands instituted a trust fund in 1996. 
 
In all three countries, participation in social security is mandatory, and coverage is nearly 
universal.  Almost all elderly (are eligible to) receive some benefits. 
 
Table 1 gives an indication of the generosity of social security in the three countries.  The 
first column shows social security expenditures as a percentage of GDP.  Italy spent 
approximately 15.7 percent of GDP on social security in 1999, far higher than the United 
                                                 
5 Laws and institutions are changing continuously.  As a general rule, we describe the status around the 
time of our household surveys, i.e., from roughly 1995 to 1999, and note major changes over time only 
where relevant.  All amounts are in 1998 currencies, unless stated otherwise.  We converted all amounts in 
Dutch guilders (NLG) or Italian liras (ITL) into euros (€) at the exchange rates that were irrevocably fixed 
at the euro’s conceptual introduction in the beginning of 1999: € 1 = NLG 2.20371 = ITL 1936.27.  On 
1/1/1999 the exchange rate of the euro and the U.S. dollar ($) was $ 1 = € 0.857.  The dollar exceeded 
parity with the Euro for several years, but had declined to $ 1 = € 0.953 by 1/1/2003.  For purposes of 
comparing purchasing power, an exchange rate of one-to-one is probably a reasonable approximation. 
6 Unless noted otherwise, our discussion does not extend to public support for the disabled and their 
dependents.   10 
States (3.9 percent in 2000) and the Netherlands (5.0 percent in 1999).  This is in minor 
part explained by the age structure of its population.  The second column shows the 
elderly dependency ratio, i.e., the size of the population that is at least 65 years old as a 
fraction of the working age population.  Italy again tops the list, but the differences are 
not large.
7  The third column shows the ratio of social security outlays as a fraction of 
GDP and the dependency ratio.  It may be interpreted as a measure of the generosity of 
each country’s social security program.  Italy remains far above the other two countries.  
This is largely because occupational pensions, which play a significant role in the United 
States and the Netherlands, are negligible in Italy—see below.  In addition, until recently, 
early retirement was very widespread in Italy, especially in the public sector.  Several 
categories of public employees could retire after 15-20 years of contributions.  Early 
retirement essentially increases the dependency ratio.   
 
Table 1.  Social Security Outlays and Dependency Ratios 
 
(1) Social security 
outlays as percentage 
of GDP (1999) 
(2) Population age 65+ 
as percentage of pop’n 
age 25-64 (1994) 
Ratio of 
(1) and (2) 
United States  3.9  24.8  0.156 
Italy 15.7  29.6  0.523 
Netherlands 5.0  24.4 0.208 
Sources:  Board of OASI Trustees (2001), Social Security Administration (2000); Franco (2000); 
Kapteyn and De Vos (1999); Bureau of the Census (1996). 
 
Social security benefits are paid in the form of a life-long annuity in all three countries. 
 
In the United States, OASI benefits are a function of historical earnings, retirement age, 
and marital status.  They may be claimed at age 62; delayed claiming results in higher 
benefits according to a schedule that is roughly actuarially fair.  In 2001, average retired 
worker benefits were $845 per month.  Aged couples received an average of $1,410 per 
month, and single elderly widow(er)s $811.  Benefits are adjusted annually for inflation.  
The replacement rate for unmarried individuals with average wages was approximately 
44 percent.  The nationwide average replacement rate, including spousal and other 
derived benefits, was approximately 56 percent in 1995 (Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1998).  
There is no minimum OASI benefit.  However, regardless of their earnings history, 
elderly individuals (couples) are eligible for a monthly SSI benefit of $530 ($796).   
 
In Italy, private sector workers may retire with full benefits at age 60 (men) or 55 
(women) or after 35 years of social security tax payments, whichever is earlier.
8  For 
                                                 
7 Italy’s fertility rate was very low during the 1990s, well below the replacement level.  While the 
dependence ratio is only somewhat larger in Italy than in the U.S. and the Netherlands, the difference is 
expected to increase markedly in the future. 
8 Italian social security benefit calculations changed materially in 1992 and, to a lesser extent, in 1995.  The 
changes will be phased in over a long period.  Workers with at least 18 years of contributions in 1995 will 
receive benefits computed on the basis of the rules applying before the 1992 reform (Franco 2000).  For 
purposes of our analysis, which focuses on individuals age 50 and older, the pre-1992 regime therefore 
applies.   11 
public sector employees, only 20 (men) or 15 (women) years of tax payments are 
required.  Benefits are a function of number of years worked and so-called pensionable 
earnings.  For private sector employees, pensionable earnings are equal to the average 
earnings of the last five years prior to retirement.  (For public sector employees, 
pensionable earnings are based on the last paycheck only.)  Pensionable earnings are 
converted into social security benefits by applying a 2 percent factor (referred to as the 
rate of return) for each year of social security tax payment up to a maximum of 40 years 
(Brugiavini 1999).  A worker can thus get at most 80 percent of his pensionable earnings.  
Earnings that enter the calculation of pensionable earnings are capped.  Benefits are 
therefore also capped, at approximately €6,000 per month in 2000.  Contributions are not 
subject to any maximum.  There is no actuarial adjustment for retirement age.
9  There are 
no spousal benefits in Italy.  However, the entire benefit becomes payable to a surviving 
spouse upon death of the retiree.  The benefit is never lower than a means-tested 
minimum benefit of approximately €370 per month in 2000.  A substantial fraction of 
retirees receive this minimum benefit.  Benefits are adjusted regularly for nominal wages.  
 
In the Netherlands, social security benefit rules are very simple.  Earnings history does 
not play a role:  the benefits are almost exclusively a function of marital status and 
residency history.  In 2001, unmarried individuals age 65 or older receive €883 per 
month; married couples with both spouses at least age 65 receive €1,206 per month.  
Married couples with one spouse below age 65 receive between €603 and €1,206, 
depending on the younger spouse’s income (Social Insurance Bank 2000).  The eligibility 
age is 65 and there is no provision for early retirement.
10  There is no link between labor 
force participation and entitlement to social security.  The full benefits apply to residents 
who have lived their entire working life (age 15-64) in the Netherlands; benefits are 
reduced by 2 percent for every year spent abroad (Kapteyn and De Vos, 1999).  Benefits 
are adjusted annually for nominal wage growth. 
 
Table 2.  Contribution and Replacement Rates 
  Contribution rate (% of taxable income) Average 
 Employer  Employee  Total  replacement 
rate 
United States  5.26  5.26  10.52  56.0 
Italy 18.93  8.34  27.27  80.0 
Netherlands 0.00  17.90  17.90  45.8 
Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) 
 
Table 2 summarizes social security contribution rates and average replacement rates for 
the three countries.  The replacement rates are the average over four scenarios and may 
therefore differ from the average nationwide replacement rates.
11 
                                                 
9 The 1992 and 1995 reforms made fundamental changes to benefit calculations.  Benefits are now 
uncapped but progressive and there is an actuarial adjustment for retirement age.  On average, the new rules 
will reduce benefits by 27-29 percent (Beltrametti 1996; Rostagno 1996). 
10 Occupational pensions often offer bridge benefits between the (early) retirement age and age 65. 
11 The replacement rates are computed as averages of four scenarios:  two earnings levels (average and two 
third of average) and two household compositions (single worker and worker with a dependent spouse).    12 
3.2. Occupational  Pensions 
 
Occupational pensions are retirement income schemes that are sponsored by employers.  
The United States, Italy, and the Netherlands vary widely in the role of occupational 
pensions.  They are widespread, well funded, and generous in the Netherlands; largely 
immaterial for most Italians (except for so-called severance pay arrangements, see 
below); and at roughly equal footing with social security in the United States.  Table 3 
shows pension assets as a percentage of GDP, the fraction of retirees with any pension 
benefits, and the fraction of the working population that is covered by a pension plan. 
 
Table 3.  Importance of Occupational Pensions (Late 1990s) 
 Funds   
(% of GDP) 




Italy Negligible Negligible  0.02 
Netherlands  118  76 (men) 23 (women)  90 
U.S.  66  48 (men) 26 (women)  44 
Source:  Johnson (1999) 
 
Traditionally, employer-sponsored pensions in the United States have been of the defined 
benefit (DB) type.  The plans are specific to individual employers, not to industry groups 
such as is mostly the case in the Netherlands.
12  Given that there are tens of thousands 
different plans, their features vary widely.  Portability is very limited.  The benefit is 
typically fixed in nominal terms upon job separation.  An increasing fraction of DB 
plans—64 percent in 1993—offers the option of a lump sum distribution upon job 
separation (Scott and Shoven, 1996).  Workers who take that option may leave the 
distribution tax-sheltered by investing it in an IRA or they may cash it out (Hurd, Lillard, 
and Panis, 1998).   
 
In 1978, 38 percent of American workers were covered by a DB pension, compared to 
only 21 percent in 1997 (Department of Labor, 2001).  Instead, defined contribution (DC) 
plans are becoming more widespread (up from seven percent in 1978 to 25 percent in 
1997).  Under DC plans, retirement income depends on the level of contributions and the 
rate of return earned on those contributions.  Workers typically decide on the allocation 
on their plan balance and bear the investment risk.   
 
In Italy, the social security program was traditionally intended to provide comprehensive 
retirement income.  In light of its social security program’s dire financial outlook, Italy 
established DC pension plans in 1992.  These plans are still in their infancy.  As of March 
1999, only approximately 400,000 workers were enrolled in a DC plan and total assets 
                                                                                                                                                 
The earnings profile is assumed to be flat and earnings are revalued according to changes in average 
earnings.  The rates refer to basic pensions, means-tested supplements, and mandatory occupational 
pensions only.  See Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998). 
12 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a federal agency, guarantees pension payments to retirees 
whose pension plan ended.   13 
represented only 0.015 percent of GDP (Banca d’Italia, 1999).  With few exceptions, 
there are no DB plans. 
 
While not strictly a pension plan, so-called severance pay arrangements have long played 
an important role in Italian retirement income security.  They are somewhat similar to DC 
plans, but are paid out upon job separation, regardless of age.  Employers contribute 6.9 
percent of workers’ wages into a self-administered fund (Franco 2000).  Workers earn a 
legally determined return on those funds of 1.5 percent plus three-fourths of the inflation 
rate.  While this severance entitlement is accruing, the worker has a secure but 
uncollectable credit with his employer, who retains full discretionary powers over the 
funds (Franco, 2000).  Upon job separation, there is a lump sum severance payment.  
Severance pay credits comprised 5.2 percent of household financial wealth in 1997 
(authors’ calculations, based on the 1998 Survey of Household Income and Wealth). 
 
In the Netherlands, occupational pensions are widespread and large.  Plans are organized 
by industry sectors and administered by industrial organizations.  Virtually all pensions 
are DB pensions.  They are easily ported across employers.  If a worker’s previous and 
new employers belong to the same industrial organization, portability is merely an 
administrative issue.  If the employers belong to different industrial organizations, the 
plan administrators settle internally such that the previous administrator disburses a lump 
sum to the new administrator.  The employee receives credit for accumulated pension 
rights as part of the new pension.
13  All benefits are paid in the form of a lifelong annuity; 
lump sum distributions upon job termination are not allowed. 
 
Table 4.  After-Tax Median Replacement Rates 




Source: Gruber and Wise (1999) 
 
Of course, what matters for individual households is the combined replacement rate 
resulting from the combination of social security and occupational pensions.  Table 4 
provides an estimate of the after tax replacement rates in the three countries for a 
“typical” (median) household.  Clearly, the replacement rate is highest in the Netherlands 
and lowest by far in the U.S..
14  Based on microdata from the three countries, we 
calculated and report below an alternative measure of replacement rate. 
                                                 
13 For example, suppose someone worked for 12 years under a plan which promises a benefit equal to 1.5 
percent of last earned salary for every year worked.  His new plan promises 2.0 percent of last earned salary 
per year worked.  The worker receives credit in his new plan for 12*1.5/2.0=9 years of work, as-if those 
years were worked at the new employer under the new pension plan. 
14 There are many ways to calculate replacement rates.  Table 4 is therefore not directly comparable to 
Table 2.  However, within table, the rates are computed in the same manner.   14 
3.3. Private  Savings 
 
In addition to claims on social security and occupational pensions, individuals build up 
private savings to support them during retirement.  Private savings may take many forms.  
They may be held in financial instruments, in real estate, or other.  They are not restricted 
to after-tax funds.  Specifically, we include IRAs, term life insurance, and similar tax-
sheltered accounts among private savings.  The largest differences in private saving 
across United States, Italy, and the Netherlands lie in opportunities to save in tax-
sheltered instruments. 
 
Americans may accumulate retirement savings in Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs).  Individuals may contribute up to $2,000 annually to IRAs.
15  In traditional IRAs, 
contributions are tax-deductible; distributions (including interest) are taxed at the time of 
the distribution.  Contributions are fully tax deductible only for persons whose income 
falls below certain phase-out levels, which depend on whether the person is covered by 
an occupational pension.  Since 1997, so-called Roth IRAs allow for after-tax 
contributions; distributions (including interest) are tax-free.  By the end of 1999, the 
assets in IRAs amounted to $2.47 trillion (Copeland 2001).  By comparison, assets of 
private DB and DC pension plans amounted to $2.14 trillion and $2.53 trillion, 
respectively (Federal Reserve 2001). 
 
There is no Italian equivalent of IRAs.  However, all Italians are eligible for term life 
insurance contracts.  The general principle of taxation on these contracts is very 
favorable:  both contributions and benefits are partially tax-exempt.  The value of life 
insurance contracts comprised 5.5 percent of household financial wealth in 1997 
(authors’ calculations, based on the 1998 SHIW). 
 
The situation is similar in the Netherlands.  Dutch law does not recognize IRAs, but 
offers tax advantages for term life insurance policies.  The limit up to which contributions 
are tax-deferred has fluctuated widely.  Prior to 1992, the limit was €7,300, fixed in 
nominal terms.  In 1992, the limit was lowered.  For the year 2000, it was €5,600 for a 
married couple.  (Starting in 2001, the limit is lower yet at only €1,000; it is higher for 
individuals with income over which no pension rights are accumulated, such as the use of 
a company car.)  Dutch term life insurance payments must take the form of a lifelong or 
fixed-term annuity.  The annuity benefits are subject to income tax. 
 
Rates of return in the stock market have varied substantially across the three countries.  
Consider the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index, representative of large 
companies and computed consistently over time and across countries.  Between 1970 and 
mid-2001, the overall annual rate of return, including re-invested dividends, was highest 
in the Netherlands (13.8 percent nominal, 10.9 percent real), followed by the United 
States (11.9 percent nominal, 8.3 percent real) and Italy (11.2 percent nominal, 2.3 
                                                 
15 Individuals who separate from a job with a pension plan may often take a lump sum distribution of their 
pension rights.  Such distributions may be rolled over into an IRA and remain tax-sheltered.  There is no 
limit on the amount that may be contributed to IRAs in this manner.   15 
percent real).  The Italian market exhibited markedly more volatility.  For example, the 
standard deviation of annual nominal returns in Italy was 34.4 percent, compared to 16.6 
percent in the U.S. and 21.7 percent in the Netherlands. 
3.4.  Capital Market Imperfections 
 
Access to capital markets for households varies across the three countries.  We discuss 
housing transactions and mortgages and transaction costs of stock purchases.   
 
Transaction costs of housing in the United States consist largely of real estate agent fees 
(approximately 6 percent of the house price) and legal fees (roughly 2 percent).  Transfer 
taxes are negligible in most areas.  In the Netherlands, transaction costs are largely real 
estate agent fees (typically 1.5 percent of the house price) and transfer tax of 6 percent.  
Legal fees are minimal by comparison.  House transaction costs are higher in Italy than in 
the United States and the Netherlands.  Real estate agent fees are 8-10 percent and a 
transfer tax of 6-7 percent applies.   
 
There is a well-developed mortgage market in the United States, including a standardized 
secondary market.  Buyers may choose variable or fixed interest rate loans of up to 30 
years’ maturity.  The typical down payment is 10 or 20 percent of the value of the house, 
but full financing is available.  Interest payments are generally fully deductible for 
income tax purposes.  The mortgage market is much less developed in Italy, perhaps due 
to banks’ limited ability to sell the house in case of default on mortgage payments.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the associated legal proceedings may take as long as 10 
years.  Banks therefore typically require a down payment of 40-50 percent of the price of 
the house.  In the Netherlands, the mortgage market is well-developed with a wide variety 
of loan options available.  Many mortgage products are tied to life insurances, largely to 
take maximal advantage of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest.  In principle, there 
are no down payment requirements.  To cover the transaction costs of buying a house, 
mortgages of up to 110 percent of the transaction price are available and common.  In 
1998, per capita mortgage debt in the United States ($15,421) and the Netherlands 
(€14,167) were almost identical and about ten times as large as in Italy (€1,415) (De 
Nederlandsche Bank 2001; Federal Reserve 2001). 
 
The three countries may also face different transaction costs for the purchase and sale of 
stocks.  An informal Internet search in March 2002 revealed roughly comparable fees for 
unassisted stock transactions via online brokers.  In the United States, E-Trade 
(us.etrade.com) charges $14.95-19.95 per transaction and Charles Schwab 
(www.schwab.com) $29.95 for up to 1,000 shares.  In the Netherlands, Robeco 
(www.robecodirect.nl) charges 0.3-0.4 percent of the total transaction, often with a €15 
minimum.  In Italy, Twicetrade (www.twicetrade.it) charges €12 plus the lower of €0.019 
per share and €19.  The differences are not large.  However, they reflect current online 
trades only.  Actual average commissions during our analysis period (mid to late 1990s), 
when online banking was far less developed, are likely much higher.  We do not have 
comparable information on trends in transaction costs.   16 
3.5.  Exposure to Financial Risks Before and After Retirement 
 
We now turn to financial risks before and after retirement.  Before retirement, the main 
source of financial risk is earnings uncertainty.  Casual observation would suggest that in 
the U.S., earnings uncertainty is considerably larger than in Italy or the Netherlands.  
Social insurance programs (unemployment, sickness, disability) in the two European 
countries are generally more generous than in the U.S., and employment protection laws 
make it relatively hard to fire employees in Italy and the Netherlands.  An interesting 
piece of direct evidence on earnings uncertainty comes from a common question asked in 
household surveys in the three countries.  The question asks respondents directly for the 
amount of income uncertainty they face.  Guiso, Jappelli and Pistaferri (1999) analyzed 
the coefficient of variation of income uncertainty for the U.S., the Netherlands, and Italy.  
They found that income uncertainty across respondents had about the same distribution in 
Italy and the Netherlands.  By contrast, U.S. respondents reported much more income 
uncertainty than the respondents in the two European countries.   
 
Loss of earnings due to disability is another important financial risk before retirement.  In 
all three countries, workers may count on long-term disability insurance in case of 
disability.  Generally, public disability insurance schemes are more generous in Italy and 
the Netherlands than in the United States.  In many cases, workers are covered by private 
disability insurance in all three countries. 
 
After retirement, the main source of financial risk is health-related.  Americans face 
greater risks of large out-of-pocket medical expenses than their Dutch and Italian 
counterparts.  In the Netherlands, virtually all elderly are covered by comprehensive 
health insurance with negligible out-of-pocket expenses.  In Italy, the public health 
system grants essentially free assistance to the entire population in case of illness.  
However, only in-patient assistance is provided, implying substantial out-of-pocket 
expenses for the elderly in case of a serious illness that requires little hospital care.  In the 
United States, the elderly may face serious out-of-pocket medical expenses, depending on 
their insurance coverage.  Elderly with low income and financial assets are typically 
eligible for Medicaid, which offers fairly comprehensive insurance, including for 
deductibles.  The risks are also limited for elderly that are covered by both private health 
insurance and Medicare, a public health insurance program for the elderly and disabled.  
However, American elderly who rely only on Medicare face substantial risks of large out-
of-pocket expenses.  Medicare consists of two components.  Coverage for Part A is 
almost universal; it covers in-patient expenses in hospitals and skilled nursing facilities.  
Most elderly also have supplemental (Part B) coverage, purchased at subsidized rates.  
Medicare requires co-payments that can be substantial, especially in the case of long 
hospital stays.   
   17 
4. Data 
 
Our analysis is based on microdata on individuals age 50 and older from each country.  
For the United States, we use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS); for Italy, the 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW); and for the Netherlands, the 
SocioEconomic Panel (SEP).  We briefly describe each survey. 
 
For the United States, we use the HRS, including all its cohorts.  The HRS is a national 
longitudinal sample of households with at least one person born in 1931-1941 (51-61 
years old at the 1992 baseline) or 1923 or before, i.e., with at least one person aged 70 or 
over in 1993.  The 1998 interview added the 1924-30 and 1942-47 birth cohorts, so that 
the most recent data cover all individuals over age 50.  We use the 1998 data and rely on 
other waves (1992-2000) where longitudinal information is needed.  The principal 
objective of the HRS is to monitor economic transitions in work, income, wealth, and 
changes in health status.  The first wave of data was collected in 1992 (1993 for the pre-
1923 birth cohort), with follow-ups fielded at approximately two-year intervals.  Blacks, 
Hispanics, and Florida residents were over sampled at a rate of two to one.  The 1998 
HRS contained 21,351 respondents:  8,949 men and 12,402 women.   
 
The main wealth data for Italy is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), 
collected by the Banca d’Italia, Italy’s central bank.  Its main purpose is to collect 
detailed data on demographics, household consumption, income, and balance sheets.  
This survey is representative of the Italian population and has been fielded biannually 
since 1984.  Financial wealth data have only been publicly available since 1989.  
Beginning in 1989, some but not all of the households were re-interviewed in subsequent 
panels.  The panel component has increased over time—in 1989, 29 percent of the 
households were re-interviewed and by 1995, 45 percent were re-interviewed.  The 
sample size is about 8,500 households.  The SHIW contains questions on detailed asset 
and debt categories.   
 
For the Netherlands, we rely on the SocioEconomic Panel (SEP), a representative panel 
survey conducted by Statistics Netherlands.  The SEP covers about 5,000 households and 
is representative of the non-institutionalized Dutch population.  It contains detailed 
information about a number of household demographic characteristics and collects data 
on household income and wealth.  The SEP has been collected annually since 1984.  It is 
a panel data set.  Since 1987, the SEP contains a wealth module with fairly detailed 
questions on asset and debt categories.  These categories have varied somewhat during 
the course of the panel.  Because of problems collecting the data, no asset and debt 
information has been collected on the self-employed since 1990.  In 1997, the SEP 
contained 8,904 respondents:  4,385 men and 4,519 women.   
   18 
5. Method  and  Hypotheses 
 
The aim of this paper is to exploit institutional variation across countries to shed light on 
the effect of different policies on the wealth accumulation and portfolio choices of 
households near or in retirement.  Since, at this stage, we are only considering three 
countries, we have in a sense only three data points to generalize from.  Thus, if we were 
to take a completely a-theoretical approach we would have very few degrees of freedom 
to establish any empirical regularity with reasonable confidence.  We therefore take a 
different approach.  Drawing on our review of the literature and the description of 
institutional differences across countries we formulate a number of stylized predictions, 
which are next confronted with the data at hand.  The more these predictions are 
corroborated by the microdata, the more confident we can be that the policies in the 
different countries help explain the differences in wealth accumulation and portfolio 
composition that we observe.   
 
An important caveat in our analysis will be that we generally assume that policies are 
exogenous.  Thus, for example, we exclude the possibility that social security benefits are 
generous because citizens of a country have an innate tendency to save too little for 
retirement.   
 
We briefly characterize a number of stylized facts that we expect to hold in the microdata 
across the three countries as a result of their institutional differences and the theoretical 
framework.  We formulate our “predictions” as rather informal hypotheses, with 
generally a ceteris paribus clause to account for other counteracting institutional effects. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The displacement effects of retirement benefits 
A straightforward implication of the LCH is that more generous retirement benefits will 
induce less saving for retirement.  We will therefore consider replacement rates at 
retirement in the three countries and predict that the country with the lowest replacement 
rate will be the country with the highest saving rate, ceteris paribus.  Based on the 
discussion in Sections 3.1 and 0 we expect retirement savings to be most prominent in the 
U.S. and least prominent in the Netherlands, at least at the median.   
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of earnings and consumption uncertainty 
Saving for precautionary reasons should be most prominent in a country with the highest 
earnings uncertainty.  We will invoke subjective information on earnings uncertainty to 
support the assumption that earnings uncertainty is highest in the U.S. and hence that we 
would expect to have the highest level of precautionary saving in the U.S., again under 
ceteris paribus conditions.  In addition to earnings uncertainty, consumption uncertainty 
may be important as well.  A prime example of consumption uncertainty would be the 
possibility of unforeseen large out-of-pocket medical expenses.  It appears that this kind 
of consumption risk is considerably larger in the U.S. than in Europe.  Hence, even after 
retirement, when earnings uncertainty presumably does not play a role anymore, we   19 
would still expect precautionary motives to lead to a stronger desire to hold bequeathable 
wealth in the U.S. than in Italy or the Netherlands. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The role of capital market imperfections 
In the basic, stripped down, version of the LCH, consumers may be borrowing to finance 
consumption at young age and enter middle age with negative wealth.  Only after 
earnings exceed optimal lifetime consumption, will saving become positive.  Clearly such 
a pattern will not be observed if capital market imperfections prevent substantial 
borrowing at young ages.  A point in case is the possibility to obtain home mortgages.  
As observed in Section 3.4, the typical minimum down payment requirement in the U.S. 
is 10-20 percent.  In Italy the minimum down payment is on the order of 40-50 percent.  
In the Netherlands one can buy a house with a negative down payment up to 10 percent 
(i.e., one can borrow 110 percent of the market value of the house).  Differences in 
capital market structure in the three countries thus predict that Italy should have the 
highest saving rate and the Netherlands the lowest.  In addition, when considering net 
household wealth, Italy should be the country where net wealth, as a percentage of gross 
wealth, is highest. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Portfolio composition 
The preceding hypotheses imply higher levels of private wealth in Italy and the U.S. upon 
retirement than in the Netherlands.  Our review of the literature then suggests that stock 
ownership in Italy and the U.S. should be higher than in the Netherlands.  On the other 
hand, the less well-developed capital market in Italy may reduce stock ownership in Italy.  
Similarly, the existence of more earnings and consumption uncertainty (e.g., medical 
expenses) in the U.S. may depress stock ownership in favor of more secure assets.  We 
hypothesize that stock ownership in the Netherlands will be the lowest among the three 
countries, because of the lowest level of private wealth.  In the U.S., the combination of a 
well-developed capital market and a high level of private wealth for retirement and 
precautionary purposes should induce a relatively high level of stock ownership. 
 
6. Empirical  Analysis 
 
We begin by presenting a number of relevant descriptive statistics for the three countries.  
We then discuss the evidence in favor of (or against) the hypotheses we have formulated 
above.  Most of the analyses are in simple tabular form, with sometimes an excursion to 
multivariate analyses. 
6.1. Descriptive  Statistics 
 
For Italy and the Netherlands, we restrict our analysis to households with a head over age 
50.  For the United States, we consider the entire 1998 HRS, representative of the 
population age 51 and older.  Table 5 presents data for 1998 for the United States and 
Italy and 1997 for The Netherlands.  The table indicates that the age distributions in the 
three countries are very similar, with samples roughly equally split between heads of   20 
household under and over age 65.  Italian and Dutch respondents are somewhat more 
likely to be married than American respondents.  Based on the educational distributions 
reported in Table 5, U.S. respondents appear to be somewhat better educated than their 
Italian and Dutch counterparts.  The comparison should be interpreted with caution, 
though, because the schooling systems differ greatly across the three countries. 
Table 5.  Demographics and Income 
(Unit of observation: Household) 
 U.S.  Italy  Netherlands 
Number of households  14,147 4,200 1,487 
Age household head     
50-59  35.1 38.0 33.0 
60-64  13.7 16.8 15.4 
65+  51.2 45.2 51.6 
Household Structure     
Couple  53.4 67.4 60.8 
Single male  11.1  8.8  10.6 
Single  female  35.5 23.8 28.7 
Education household head
*     
Elementary 33.0
a 51.8  30.6 
Some high school    24.8  18.4
b 
High  school  29.2 16.5 32.2
c 
Some college  37.8  7.0  18.8
d 
HH non-capital income     
Mean  $26,500 €24,000 €24,600 
Median  $18,800 €20,400 €21,300 
Note: Definitions of education categories vary: 
a less than high school;  
c middle vocational; 
b lower vocational/junior high school;  
d at least high school 
 
The mean non-capital after-tax household income in the U.S. was higher than in Italy and 
the Netherlands, whereas median income was lower.
16  The pattern reversal reflects a 
more equal income distribution in Italy and the Netherlands compared to the United 
States. 
 
Our hypotheses are couched in terms of accumulated savings and allocation into risky 
assets.  Given the information in the microdata, we define risky assets as stock and bond 
holdings.  An intuitive measure of risky asset allocation is the ratio of risky assets to net 
worth.  Unfortunately, non-negligible subsamples report zero or negative net worth, so 
that the ratio of risky assets to net worth cannot be determined or is very difficult to 
                                                 
16 The American HRS collects gross income data, whereas the Italian SHIW and Dutch SEP ask for after-
tax income.  We estimated tax liabilities to convert the American income data to be net of taxes.  Since the 
state of residence and many financial details are unknown, we assume standard deductions and account for 
federal taxation only.  This includes federal income tax and Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) 
liabilities.  Incomes after state income tax, where applicable, are therefore slightly lower than reported in 
Table 5.   21 
interpret.  Instead, we define two related measures.  Consider households’ balance sheets 
in Figure 2. 
 
Assets Liabilities 
Safe (cash, savings accounts) .........S  Net worth ........................NW 
Risky (stocks, bonds) .....................R  Debts...................................D 
Gross housing................................. H  (mortgage and other) 
(housing equity + mortgage debt)   
Other............................................... O  
Gross wealth................................GW  Gross wealth....................GW 
 
Figure 2.  Stylized Household Balance Sheet 
 
We decompose the ratio of risky assets to net worth as follows: 
 
Exposure Solvency
RR G W RN W
GW GW NW GW NW
== = i  
 
Very few respondents report having no gross wealth at all.  Both “exposure,” defined as 
the ratio of risky assets to gross wealth, and “solvency,” defined as the ratio of net worth 
to gross wealth, are therefore straightforward to construct. 
 
Table 6 characterizes the size and composition of bequeathable household wealth in the 
three samples.  The American and Italian figures are based on 1998 HRS and SHIW, the 
Dutch on the 1997 SEP.  As predicted, the Netherlands has by far the lowest level of 
private household wealth, both in the mean and in the median.  Partly this reflects the 
lower home ownership rate in the Netherlands for these older cohorts.  Stock or bond 
ownership is highest in the U.S. (33 percent) and lowest in the Netherlands (19 percent).  
Following Figure 2, we aggregated assets in four broad categories: (1) Safe assets (saving 
and checking accounts, cash); (2) risky assets (stocks and bonds); (3) housing and other 
real estate; (4) other.  Since the Dutch sample excludes self-employed, we have excluded 
business equity in all countries.  U.S. households clearly hold the most risky assets, both 
in absolute value and as a fraction of gross wealth.  Dutch households hold more of their 
gross wealth in safe assets than the Americans and Italians.  Again, this partly reflects the 
lower home ownership rate in the Netherlands for this age group.  In both the U.S. and 
the Netherlands, the share of risky assets increased between 1992 and 1997/8 (not 
shown).  The average solvency ratios are large and negative in the United States and 
Italy, because the ratios are dominated by households with negative net worth that is 
large relative to their reported gross wealth.     22 
 
Table 6.  Assets and Asset Allocation 
(Unit of observation: household) 
(Monetary values in $ for the U.S. and in € for Italy and the Netherlands) 
   U.S.  Italy  Netherlands
Gross wealth  mean  276,200  168,100  95,300
 median 130,000  96,500  45,200
Net worth  mean  253,400  166,200  79,300
 median 105,000  95,000  33,500
Owns house (%)  mean  76.8  71.8  46.5 
 median 100  100  0 
Owns stocks/bonds (%)  mean  33.0  26.8  18.7 
 median 0  0  0 
Exposure (R/GW)  mean  0.079  0.051  0.039 
 median 0  0  0 
Solvency (NW/GW)  mean  -51.8  -18.3  0.62 
 median 1  1  1 
Housing equity (if owner)  mean  128,200  121,800  111,600
 median 95,000  100,000  95,800
Stocks/bonds (if owner)  mean  169,500  54,483  45,700
 median 45,000  20,000  16,900
Portfolio shares (%)         
Safe (S/GW)  mean  20.4  29.4  43.4 
Risky (R/GW)  mean  7.9  5.1  3.9 
House (H/GW)  mean  45.6  53.2  38.6 
Other (O/GW)  mean 26.0 12.3 14.0 
 
6.2. Empirical  Evidence  for the Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: The displacement effects of retirement benefits 
Although we have provided some evidence that replacement rates at retirement are lowest 
in the U.S. and highest in the Netherlands, it is useful to exploit our microdata to shed 
further light on this.  The replacement rates given in Section 3.2 above were based on 
hypothetical (median) individuals in the three different countries, and on “plausible” 
institutional parameters.  Here we take a different approach.  We exploit the longitudinal 
nature of the data to consider incomes in the waves before and after a respondent first 
reports being retired to gauge the actual change in income experienced by those who 
retire.  For example, if someone first reports being retired in 1994, we consider incomes 
as reported in 1993 and 1995.  (In the American HRS and Italian SHIW data, the waves 
are two years apart, except three years for the 1995-8 SHIW.)  This approach avoids 
contamination from part-year employment.  We consider household non-capital income 
before and after individual retirement.  This assumes resource sharing within a 
household, so that for instance a transfer of resources by other household members 
compensates for a drop in the new retiree’s income.  This assumption acknowledges the   23 
joint nature of retirement decisions (e.g., Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer, 1996; Gustman 
and Steinmeier, 1994; Maestas, 2001).  Finally, we consider after-tax income,
17 expressed 
in constant 1998 dollars.   
 
The top panel of Table 7 presents empirical after-tax replacement rates for the United 
States based on the 1992-2000 HRS.  The table compares incomes in the wave before 
retirement and the wave after retirement,
18 i.e., at t-2 and t+2.  Post-retirement income is 
substantially lower than pre-retirement income, both in the mean and the median.
19  The 
average replacement rate is well above unity, but this is driven by a small number of 
respondents with particularly low pre-retirement income.  The median replacement rate is 
75.7 percent.  There is large variation: at the 10
th percentile, income dropped by three-
quarters after retirement, whereas it increased by three-quarters in real terms at the 90
th 
percentile.   
 
To put these findings in perspective, compare the income changes between the year 
before retirement and the year after retirement with income changes of individuals who 
did not retire (i.e., who worked in years t-2, t, t+2, or who were retired in all three 
waves).  We observe that the latter individuals also experienced a decline in real income, 
at least at the median.  The decline in income is far smaller at the median (2.2 percent) 
than the median decline among newly retired individuals (24.3 percent).   
 
The replacement rate improves if we assume that individuals who retire can annuitize 
their wealth and consume the annuity.  Adding the annuity value of bequeathable wealth 
to post-retirement income, possible consumption levels exceed pre-retirement income for 
most households.  We define the generalized replacement rate as the sum of post-
retirement income and annuity value of private wealth divided by pre-retirement income.  
At the median, the generalized replacement rate is above one (111.4 percent).  Even at the 
10
th percentile, post-retirement consumption may be sustained at almost half the level of 
pre-retirement income. 
 
The bottom part of Table 7 presents a similar analysis for household net worth around 
retirement and compares changes to wealth changes of households in which no retirement 
takes place.  Most households experience wealth growth, but wealth grows somewhat 
faster for households who do not have a recently retired member.  At the median, the 
increase is 2.2 percent among households that transitioned through retirement and 6.6 
percent among those who did not.   
                                                 
17 See footnote 16 (page 13). 
18 For the United States and Italy, retirement is defined based on respondents’ own report of (complete) 
retirement status.  For the Netherlands, retirement is defined as receiving some form of income transfer 
(pension, disability, or unemployment benefits), being over 50 years old, and not doing any work for pay.   
19 In order to exploit the longitudinal feature of the HRS, the sample consists of original HRS respondents, 
i.e., those born in 1931-41 and their spouses.  The sample is thus younger than the sample used in Table 5, 
which included all HRS cohorts.  This explains why mean and median income levels in Table 7 exceed 
those in Table 5.   24 
 
Table 7.  Empirical replacement rates, wealth accumulation, and income growth in 
the United States 





Newly retired         
Pre-retirement HH non-
capital income  1,953 36,600 6,900 30,600  69,500
Post-retirement income  1,797 26,100 6,500 21,200  47,300
Post-retirement income + 
annuity value of wealth  1,797 44,100 9,000 34,100  83,100
Replacement rate (%)  1,749 147.1 28.7 75.7  175.2
Generalized repl. rate
a   1,749 261.0 47.6 111.4  271.6
Not newly retired   
Non-capital HH inc. t-2  29,442 36,800 7,000 30,000  69,200
Non-capital HH inc. t+2  28,894 35,900 6,300 29,500  68,700
Income ratio (t+2)/(t-2) (%)  19,463 213.1 33.5 97.8  179.6
Newly retired   
Pre-retirement HH net worth  1,982 215,200 1,100 115,600  491,600
Post-retirement HH net worth 1,815 254,900 1,000 124,700  594,500
Wealth growth (%)  1,746 41.9 -85.1 2.2  169.0
Not newly retired   
Net worth t-2  29,735 246,400 2,500 113,200  552,200
Net worth t+2  29,204 267,700 3,200 119,900  588,000
Wealth growth (%)  19,936 114.3 -83.2 6.6  192.8
a Post-retirement non-capital household income + annuity value of wealth divided by pre-retirement non-
capital household income.  The annuity value assumes a 3 percent interest rate. 
 
Similar to Table 7, Table 8 documents income replacement rates, wealth accumulation, 
and income growth in Italy, based on 1987-98 data.  Table 7 was in 1998 dollars; Table 8 
in 1998 euros.  As in the United States, real household non-capital income tends to drop 
after retirement.  However, the declines are milder.  At the median, post-retirement 
Italian household incomes replace 85.9 percent of pre-retirement income, about ten 
percentage points above the median U.S. replacement rate.  While there is substantial 
variation, the differences are smaller than in the U.S.  For example, at the 10
th and 90
th 
percentile, post-retirement incomes are about 50 percent below and above their pre-
retirement levels, compared to three-quarter differences in the United States.  At the 
median, real incomes among households that did not transition through a retirement 
remained almost exactly constant.  Naturally, the replacement rates increase when 
including the annuity value of net worth.  The median generalized replacement rate for 
new retirees in Italy is 124.5 percent, again greater than in the United States (111.4 
percent). 
 
Italian households enjoyed greater wealth gains than American households during the 
mid and late 1990s.  At the median, net worth among households with a new retiree 
increased by 24 percent.  This gain exceeds the gain among households that did not   25 
experience a retirement (14.5 percent), probably because of severance payments (see 
above). 
 
Table 8.  Empirical replacement rates, wealth accumulation, and income growth in 
Italy 





Newly retired         
Pre-retirement HH non-
capital income  402 33,800 15,300 30,150 55,300
Post-retirement income  402 30,300 11,600 26,150  51,800
Post-retirement income + 
annuity value of wealth  402 46,100 14,000 39,100  79,500
Replacement rate (%)  402 97.3 49.1 85.9  147.5
Generalized repl. rate
a   402 143.7 65.5 124.5  231.9
Not newly retired   
Non-capital HH inc. t-2  5,682 25,300 9,800 21,500  45,100
Non-capital HH inc. t+2  5,682 26,000 9,600 21,400  46,300
Income ratio (t+2)/(t-2) (%)  5,673 112.0 57.9 100.8  170.0
Newly retired   
Pre-retirement HH net worth  402 187,200 7,700 122,650  435,200
Post-retirement HH net worth 402 225,000 11,100 153,650  515,400
Wealth growth (%)  398 320.8 -68.4 24.0  350.6
Not newly retired   
Net worth t-2  5,682 154,600 3,800 87,900  350,600
Net worth t+2  5,682 189,900 4,400 110,000  431,500
Wealth growth (%)  5,595 305.2 -73.3 14.5  373.2
a Post-retirement non-capital household income + annuity value of wealth divided by pre-retirement non-
capital household income.  The annuity value assumes a 3 percent interest rate. 
 
Table 9 shows the same set of statistics for the Netherlands, based on 1984-97 income 
reports and 1987-97 wealth data.  Income and wealth values are in 1998 euros.  Dutch 
replacement rates generally exceed those of both the United States and Italy.  At the 
median, fully 102.3 percent of real pre-retirement income is replaced.  The spread is 
narrower than in the other two countries.  At the 10
th and 90
th percentile, only about one-
third of pre-retirement income is lost or gained, compared to one-half in Italy and three-
quarters in the United States.  Dutch households without a new retiree also fared well—at 
the median, their real household non-capital income rose by 8.1 percent.  The spread is 
again small, much smaller than in the United States and Italy.  (This is in part explained 
by the fact that the Dutch income and wealth figures refer to survey waves that are only 
two years apart; the Dutch SEP survey is conducted annually, whereas American HRS 
and Italian SHIW waves are generally two years apart.)  Adding in the annuity value of 
net worth increases the replacement rates, though not by very much.  This reflects the 
small average wealth holdings among Dutch households. 
   26 
In the Netherlands, households with a newly retired member enjoyed an increase of 4.5 
percent in net worth, far lower than in Italy but somewhat higher than in the United 
States.  The increase among households without a retiring member was one-eighth in two 
years time, more than the comparable American and Italian figures. 
 
Table 9.  Empirical replacement rates, wealth accumulation, and income growth in 
the Netherlands  





Newly retired        
Pre-retirement HH non-
capital  income  772 22,200  10,500 18,800  38,600 
Post-retirement  income  772 21,900  10,900 18,600  37,400 
Post-retirement income + 
annuity value of wealth  772  26,900  12,100  22,900  49,700 
Replacement rate (%)  772  113.9  68.0  102.3  138.3 
Generalized repl. rate
a    772 137.1  80.8 114.5  187.2 
Not newly retired         
Non-capital HH inc. t-1  52,333  27,300  12,600  25,900  43,200 
Non-capital HH inc. t+1  52,333  29,600  13,000  28,100  47,000 
Income ratio (t+1)/(t-1) (%)  52,333  124.3  81.8  108.1  138.9 
Newly retired         
Pre-retirement HH net worth  802  63,400 600 23,400  172,600
Post-retirement HH net worth 802  67,000 800 23,000  175,400
Wealth growth (%)  800  -82.0  -61.2  4.5  128.3 
Not newly retired         
Net worth t-1  55,995  47,900 100 23,300  121,500
Net worth t+1  55,995  57,100 400 31,100  141,100
Wealth growth (%)  55,995  118.2  -79.7  12.5  164.2 
a Post-retirement non-capital household income + annuity value of wealth divided by pre-retirement non-
capital household income.  The annuity value assumes a 3 percent interest rate. 
 
In summary, replacement rates are lowest in the United States and highest in the 
Netherlands, with a gap at the median of 26.6 percentage points.  However, American 
households accumulate far more private savings than their Dutch counterparts.  The 
replacement rate gap narrows to just 3.1 percentage points when we include the annuity 
value of net worth in the calculations.  This is fully consistent with a life cycle model in 
which retirement saving is crowded out by institutional old age pension provisions in the 
Netherlands, but much less so in the U.S. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of earnings and consumption uncertainty 
 
Section 3.5 argued that Americans face greater financial risks, both before and after 
retirement.  A problem in a cross-country context with the data at hand is that we do not 
have individual information on the amount of uncertainty faced by the individuals in our   27 
sample.  Since there are at least two different strong incentives for households in the U.S. 
to accumulate more private wealth than in Italy or the Netherlands (precaution and to 
provide for retirement), it is probably impossible to disentangle the relative influence of 
the two different incentives.  We have argued above that in any case retirement 
provisions provide a powerful explanation for the difference in wealth accumulation 
between the U.S. and the Netherlands.  Providing further insight into the patterns of 
wealth accumulation in Italy, the Netherlands, and the U.S., Table 10 presents results of a 
regression of household net worth on a number of household characteristics. 
 
Since both household income and net worth have a skewed distribution, we have applied 
a log-like transformation to these variables.  A direct logarithmic transformation is not 
possible, since both variables can take on negative values.  Hence we adopted the inverse 
hyperbolic sine:  () ( )
2 log 1 hx x x =+ + .  For values of x not too close to zero, h(x) is 
approximately equal to  () log 2x  for positive x and  ( ) log 2x −  for negative x.  The 
function h(x) is anti-symmetric:  ( ) ( ) hx h x = −−.  The drawback of the inverse 
hyperbolic sine in comparison to the logarithm is that it is not invariant to a change of 
units.  The regressions reported involve both quantities measured in U.S. dollars and 
quantities measured in euros.  If we were to use logs of the monetary variables, the 
currency differences would simply be absorbed in the country-specific intercepts.  For the 
inverse hyperbolic sine, that is only approximately true.
20 
 
Table 10 presents two regressions.  The first regression involves full interactions of all 
variables with country dummies, which is equivalent with having separate equations for 
each country.  It turned out that the age functions of Italy and the Netherlands are quite 
similar, an impression that was confirmed by a statistical test.  Hence, the regression was 
repeated with identical age functions for the Netherlands and Italy.  We specified the 
effect of age on wealth accumulation as a fifth degree polynomial.  Rather than 
presenting the estimated coefficients of the polynomials, we sketch the estimated age 
functions in Figure 3. 
 
separate age functions per country
HH head age
 Netherlands  U.S.
 Italy






age functions of It and NL equal
HH head age
 Netherlands/Italy  U.S.







Figure 3.  Estimated age functions in the net worth regressions 
                                                 
20 We measure net worth in dollars and euros, so that the outcome is far from zero for most respondents 
with nonzero net worth.  At zero, there is no scale issue.   28 
 
Table 10.  Cross country regressions for net worth 
Dependent variables:  
Inverse hyperbolic sine h(.) of household net worth 




Dummy SEP1992  541.482  4.479 
 (0.74)  (6.26)** 
Dummy SEP1997  541.655  4.673 
 (0.74)  (6.49)** 
Dummy HRS1992  622.872  -41.788 
 (0.86)  (0.56) 
Dummy HRS1998  622.080  -42.579 
 (0.85)  (0.57) 
h(non-cap hh inc.) US  0.308  0.308 
(17.61)** (17.61)** 
h(non-cap hh inc.) IT  0.668  0.668 
 (11.80)**  (11.81)** 
h(non-cap hh inc.) NL  0.031  0.024 
 (0.72)  (0.56) 
Dummy retired, US  -0.697  -0.697 
 (11.52)**  (11.52)** 
Dummy retired, IT  0.907  0.933 
 (5.21)**  (5.57)** 
Dummy retired, NL  0.530  0.648 
 (2.05)*  (3.15)** 
High school, US  1.073  1.073 
 (8.68)**  (8.68)** 
More than H.S., US  1.682  1.682 
 (18.07)**  (18.06)** 
Some high school, IT  0.900  0.916 
 (4.73)**  (4.86)** 
High school, IT  1.529  1.550 
 (6.89)**  (7.03)** 
Some college, IT  2.016  2.017 
 (6.47)**  (6.48)** 
Lower voc./jr. high, NL  1.034  1.009 
 (4.02)**  (3.94)** 
Middle vocational, NL  2.044  1.989 
 (8.92)**  (8.82)** 
Some college, NL  2.829  2.788 
 (10.42)**  (10.41)** 
Observations 21,517  21,517 
R-squared 0.08  0.08 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; 
Significance:  * = 5%; ** = 1% 
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Figure 3 shows that after age 50, American households keep accumulating wealth at a 
brisk pace, whereas the age profile in the Netherlands and Italy is approximately flat or 
slightly downward sloping.  This would be consistent with the prevalence of a 
precautionary motive to guard against high out-of-pocket medical costs in the U.S. as 
compared to Italy and the Netherlands.  Here, and repeatedly in subsequent analyses 
below, we have to offer the caveat that we are not controlling for cohort effects, so that 
the age effects we observe may be (and probably are) contaminated by cohort effects.  
Disentangling age and cohort effects is beyond the scope of the current study. 
 
Since the definitions of education levels differ substantially across the three countries, all 
education dummies are country-specific.  The lowest education category is always the 
reference category.  Net worth increases monotonically with education in all three 
countries. 
 
The effect of being retired differs substantially across the three countries, with a negative 
effect in the U.S. and positive effects in the Netherlands and Italy.  We should be 
somewhat careful in interpreting these results, as retirement status is correlated with age.  
In particular, the negative effect of being retired on net worth in the U.S should be 
considered jointly with the strong positive age effect on net worth, shown in Figure 3.  
More importantly, retirement may be partly endogenous in the sense that retirement is 
more likely for individuals with more wealth.  Thus the positive sign of the retirement 
dummy in Italy and the Netherlands may simply reflect that people with more wealth are 
more likely to retire.  With this interpretation, the sign of the retirement dummy in the 
U.S. is harder to understand.   
 
Household income has a positive influence on capital accumulation.  However, the 
strength of the effect varies substantially across the three countries.  In the Netherlands 
the effect of income is very small and not statistically significant.  In Italy and the U.S. it 
is much bigger and very significant.  The discussion of the next hypothesis interprets this 
pattern. 
Hypothesis 3:  The role of capital market imperfections 
The implications of the differences in capital markets in the U.S., the Netherlands, and 
Italy are that ceteris paribus, Italy should have the highest saving rate and the 
Netherlands the lowest (Section 6).  In addition, when considering net household wealth 
Italy should be the country where net wealth, as a percentage of gross wealth, should be 
highest.  The former implication is hard to test directly, because of other factors 
influencing saving rates, but the latter implication is easy to verify.   
 
Table 6 shows that median solvency (net worth divided by gross wealth) is equal to one 
in all three countries.  The ratios of median net worth and median gross wealth in Table 6 
are 0.81 in the U.S., 0.98 in Italy, and 0.74 in the Netherlands.  Thus, for a given level of 
net worth Italian households borrow considerably less money than households in the U.S. 
and the Netherlands.  The weaker borrowing constraints in the latter countries induce 
lower private capital accumulation. 
   30 
Somewhat tentatively, we interpret the high coefficient of non-capital income in the 
wealth regressions in Table 10 for Italy as another indication of the relevance of 
borrowing constraints.  Conceivably, the harder it is to borrow money to invest in 
profitable undertakings (e.g., real estate or stocks), the more important income becomes 
as a source of capital for investment.  Thus ceteris paribus the connection between 
income and wealth accumulation would be stronger in Italy than in the U.S. or the 
Netherlands. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Portfolio composition 
In Section 5, we hypothesized that stock ownership in the Netherlands will be the lowest 
among the three countries, because of the lowest level of private wealth.  In the U.S., the 
combination of a well-developed capital market and a high level of private wealth for 
retirement purposes should induce a relatively high level of stock ownership.  Italy 
should be in between, because it has a relatively high level of private wealth but a less-
developed capital market.  To shed light on the plausibility of these hypotheses, Table 11 
presents results from cross-country regressions of the share of risky assets (stocks and 
bonds) in gross wealth.  The approach is similar to the approach in Table 10.  We start 
with separate analyses by country and then simplify the model by imposing equality of 
parameters allowed by the data.  Since shares are between zero and one by construction, 
we use a two-limit Tobit model to estimate the equation, with a lower limit equal to zero 
and an upper limit equal to one. 
 
The first column presents estimates of the unrestricted equations.  A test for equality of 
the age functions across countries is far from rejection and hence the second column 
imposes equal age functions.  A test of equality of the income coefficients across the 
three countries is almost rejected at the 5 percent level (F(2,21419)=2.83, p=.0590).  
Similarly, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the net worth coefficients of the U.S. and 
Italy are equal (F(1, 21419)=2.73, p=.0984) at the 5 percent level.  The last column 
presents estimation results with these equalities imposed.  Figure 4 sketches the estimated 









































Figure 4.  A common age function to explain risky asset share across the three 
countries 
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Table 11.  The share of risky assets across countries 
Dependent variables: share of risky assets in gross wealth 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dummy  HRS1992  -43.591 0.205 0.062 
 (0.63)  (2.45)*  (4.19)** 
Dummy  HRS1998  -43.554 0.244 0.101 
 (0.63)  (2.92)**  (6.47)** 
Dummy SEP1992  -29.098  -0.437  -0.643 
 (0.42)  (3.60)**  (7.54)** 
Dummy SEP1997  -29.077  -0.415  -0.631 
 (0.42)  (3.39)**  (7.28)** 
h(non-cap inc.) US  0.015  0.015   
 (9.17)**  (9.24)**   
h(non-cap inc.) IT  0.018  0.019   
 (2.83)**  (2.91)**   
h(non-cap inc.) NL  0.004  0.004   
 (1.00)  (0.96)   
h(net worth) US  0.052  0.052   
 (32.30)**  (32.36)**   
h(net worth) IT  0.060  0.061   
 (12.01)**  (12.14)**   
h(net  worth)  NL  0.109 0.109 0.105 
  (15.32)** (15.30)** (14.67)** 
Dummy retired, US  -0.000  0.001  0.001 
  (0.00) (0.17) (0.17) 
Dummy retired, IT  0.075  0.067  0.068 
  (4.89)** (4.87)** (4.95)** 
Dummy retired, NL  0.031  0.047  0.050 
 (1.10)  (2.39)*  (2.50)* 
High school, US  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006 
  (0.43) (0.52) (0.54) 
More than H.S., US  0.075  0.074  0.074 
  (9.45)** (9.34)** (9.29)** 
Some H.S., IT  0.085  0.089  0.093 
  (5.14)** (5.49)** (5.80)** 
High  school,  IT  0.143 0.146 0.155 
  (7.83)** (8.09)** (8.91)** 
Some college, IT  0.154  0.156  0.169 
  (6.31)** (6.38)** (7.35)** 
L.voc./j.high, NL  -0.011  -0.015  0.003 
  (0.33) (0.46) (0.10) 
Middle  voc.,  NL  0.088 0.084 0.094 
  (3.38)** (3.22)** (3.55)** 
Some college, NL  0.170  0.169  0.182 
  (6.09)** (6.10)** (6.49)** 
h(non-cap income)      0.015 
     (9.67)** 
h(net worth)      0.053 
     (34.39)** 
Observations  21447 21445 21344 
Pseudo  R-squared  .21 .21 .21 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; 
Significance:  * = 5%; ** = 1%   32 
 
For convenience, we restrict a discussion of Table 11 to the last column.  Household 
income has a relatively small but significant direct influence on the share of risky assets 
held.  Its influence is positive, which would be consistent with a model where income can 
be used to buffer risks incurred by investing in the risky assets (i.e., having a higher non-
capital income reduces background risk in some informal sense).  Of course, there is also 
an indirect effect of income via its effect on total net worth, as discussed with respect to 
Table 10 above.  Net worth has a positive effect on the share of risky assets in all three 
countries, as expected. 
 
The share of risky assets in gross wealth increases with education in all countries (except 
the difference between high school and less than high school in the U.S.; the difference 
between these two education levels is not statistically significant).  This can be 
interpreted in at least two different ways: (1) owning stocks or bonds requires a certain 
level of knowledge which is more likely to be present among the higher-educated; (2) a 
higher education level reduces risks in the labor market and this reduction in background 
risk makes an individual less risk-averse. 
 
We note that the indicator for being retired is insignificant in the U.S and significantly 
positive in both Italy and the Netherlands.  A possible interpretation is that after 
retirement income and consumption risks have essentially disappeared in Italy and the 
Netherlands, whereas in the U.S. consumption risk associated with adverse health shocks 
becomes more important.  This risk reduction after retirement in Italy and the 
Netherlands would allow households to take on more risk in the stock market. 
 
It is tempting to interpret the country- and wave-specific dummies as propensities to hold 
risky assets after controlling for the variables listed in Table 11.  One should note 
however, that in general the values of the dummies are sensitive to the scaling of the 
monetary variables.  If for instance, we switch from dollars and euros to thousands of 
dollars and euros, then to a good approximation all monetary variables are reduced by 
ln(1,000)=6.91.  Since the monetary variables have different coefficients for different 
countries such changes in monetary units affect country- and wave-specific dummies 
differentially, without changing the underlying model.  The only valid comparison in 
Table 11 is between Italy and the U.S. in the last column, because we have restricted the 
coefficients of net worth and household income to be equal.  We notice that the dummies 
for the U.S. are significantly positive, consistent with the notion that a more developed 
capital market in the U.S. facilitates stock and bond ownership, controlling for education, 
wealth, and demographics. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The analysis in this paper is a first attempt at consistently exploiting institutional 
variation across countries to improve our understanding of wealth accumulation and 
portfolio choice of households at or near retirement.  The number of countries considered 
is limited, as is the amount of detail in the data that we have been able to use.  The 
stylized facts that we are able to glean from the microdata are certainly consistent with 
the hypotheses that we formulated.  In summary, their main implications are as follows: 
 
•  Americans should save more for retirement than the Dutch or the Italians; 
•  Americans should save more due to more exposure to uninsurable income and 
consumption risk; 
•  Italians should save more due to severe borrowing constraints in their country; 
•  The Dutch should have relatively low stockholdings due to the low level of 
private wealth; 
•  Stock-ownership in the U.S. should be higher than in Italy because of more 
developed capital markets in the United States. 
 
While each of these implications is borne out by the data, it is in general not possible to 
establish the relative magnitude of factors influencing wealth accumulation or portfolio 
choice.  For instance, both low replacement rates at retirement and higher consumption 
and income risk in the U.S. imply that Americans should save more than Europeans.  
Without further analysis, we cannot determine what the relative role of these factors is.   
 
It is worthwhile to extend the analysis in two main directions.  First, it is very desirable to 
add countries to have more institutional variation that can be exploited.  Second, the 
current data can be analyzed more extensively and more information can be brought to 
bear on the hypotheses formulated.  In particular, one could exploit the longitudinal 
nature of the data more, e.g., to disentangle age and cohort effects but also to exploit time 
series variation in addition to cross-sectional and cross-country variation.  This will also 
permit addressing some endogeneity issues, like the timing of retirement.     34 
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